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Articles
jUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE IN THE CRMiNAL LAw:
DEFENCES UNDER THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
Ameya Kilara*
George Fletcher's theory, 'Justificationand Excuse in the Criminal
Law', has contributed to a deeper theoretical understanding of
exculpatory defences in the discipline. It is a theory that not only
has important practical implicationsfor evidentiary issues related
to criminal trials but also has a bearing on the very fulfilment of the
objectives of criminallaw. In this article, the authorapplies Fletcher's
theory to exculpatory defences under the Indian Penal Code and
finds that it demonstrates an inadequate appreciationof the
justification-excuse distinction. As a possible remedy, the author
suggests certain amendments and additions to the Indian law
pertaining to exculpatory defences in order to eliminate the
inconsistencies resulting therefrom and making it theoretically
defensible.
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INTRODUCTION
Individual defences in the criminal law, such as self-defence or insanity,
have always been the subject of much critical attention. However, the theoretical
basis for such defences as a class, had been by and large ignored resulting in
various inconsistencies within the law of individual defences. Contemporary
interest in these defences has been stimulated, to a great extent, by George
Fletcher's theory of 'Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law'.' Fletcher's
basic message has been the value of distinguishing systematically between
justifications and excuses, as distinct forms of exculpation. The argument has
been made primarily with respect to understanding the shape and tensions within
the present law of exculpatory defences. A thorough understanding and systematic
pursuit of this distinction has also been presented as a guide for the rationalization
and reform of defences. In Fletcher's own words,
"... the distinction between justification and excuse is of fundamental
theoretical and practical value.., it is essential to a rational criminal code."
Much of the writing in this area in recent times either builds on Fletcher's
ideas or sets out to criticize them?. However a majority of such writing has been
located in and speaks to Anglo-American and Continental legal systems, with
little more than a perfunctory reference to other criminal codes, which might be
at variance with the former systems. The result is that the theory of justification
and excuse remains particularly weak in legal systems such as India. Consequently
a critical analysis of the defences provided under the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter
"IPC") remains haphazard and of relatively less rigour. The drawing of this
distinction is crucial since it has implications for the standard of proof and burden
of proof in criminal trials. It also determines the legal liabilities of third parties.
Moreover, the distinction becomes important in ensuring that the criminal law
sends out an internally coherent set of moral messages to society. An attempt to

2

G.FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw (2000); G.Fletcher, The IndividualizationofExcusing
Conditions, in JUSTIFICATION AND ExcusE iN TlE CRIMINAL LAw (M.L.Corrado, ed., 1994).
E.Colvin, Exculpatory Defences in Criminal Law, (1990) 10(3) OxFoRD JouRNAL of LEGAL
STUDIES 381, 382.

3 For criticism of Fletcher's theory, see M.Corrado, Notes on a Theory of the Structure of
Excuses, (1y91) 82(3) Tu JOURNAL OF

CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY 465.
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strengthen the existing theory of defences is thus worthy of greater critical
attention.
This article tries to make a start in addressing this lacuna in Indian criminal
theory. Its concern is to systematically analyse the exculpatory claims under the
IPC using Fletcher's theory and inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it
as analytical tools towards this end.
Section I explains the theoretical distinction between justifications and
excuses and the significance of appreciating this distinction. Section II examines
some of the defences under the IPC and attempts to classify them using Fletcher's
categorization. Ambiguities are pointed out and an analysis of the problematic
provisions is undertaken. Section III examines the implications of Fletcher's
distinction for punishment. Section IV examines the procedural analogue of the
structural relationship of exculpatory claims to the notion of wrongdoing in
substantive criminal law. A critique of the relevant aspects of Indian Evidence
law is accordingly undertaken in this section.

1. JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE DISTINGUISHED
A. Relationship to the Legal Norm
The distinct notions of justification and excuse, as different types of
exculpatory claims in the criminal law, are best understood by examining their
relationship to prohibitory legal norms. A norm is a statement that a particular
human conduct is wrongful and therefore prohibited. It generally reflects the
moral consensus in society at a particular time concerning the morally or socially
repulsive nature of the conduct in question. "Thou shalt not kill" and "Thou shalt
not steal" are examples of norms that nearly all societies have sought to preserve
in their legal systems down the ages. A legal offence is constituted when there is a
violation of a norm. The "definition" of an offence contains objective and subjective
elements that are ordinarily necessary and sufficient conditions for punishment
to be imposed.4
A justification creates an exception to a legal norm in certain "extraordinary
circumstances".5 It tries to carve out a sphere of human conduct where the
otherwise wrongful conduct is not considered wrongful but is in fact, justified by
4

Id.

5 Under normal circumstances, general norms such as 'Thou shalt not kill' govern the
conduct of individuals. However, in certain situations, such as one in which a person
is under attack, "extraordinary circumstances" are said to exist which justify conduct
(such as an attack in self-defence) which would otherwise be prohibited by the general
norm.
14
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the surrounding circumstances. It can be understood as the "exercising of a
privilege" by the accused.6 In a sense, justifications are concerned with a particular
act that is justified in a particular set of circumstances2 In contrast, an excuse is
not a claim that the extraordinary circumstances of the defendant make the
conduct less wrongful. Rather, it is a claim that concerns the justness of holding
the particular actor so situated responsible for the wrongful conduct in question-8
The claim of Self Defence, in Fletcher's view, is a paradigmatic justification
while the claims of Insanity and Involuntary Intoxication are paradigmatic of
excuses. In a case of homicide, the former would involve conceding that killing an
aggressor is not wrongful in extreme situations of aggression. The latter would
involve a plea that an insane or involuntarily intoxicated person ought not to be
held responsible for the wrongful deed committed. Thus excuses question the
attributionsof the criminal conduct to the actor in question.
B. Theoretical Underpinnings
Table ji.i: the theoretical rationales of Excuse and Justificationwith examples
Justification * Utilitarian: Harm avoided is greater * Claim of lesser evils

than harm caused

*

Necessity

* Privileging of greater interest + * Self Defence
appropriate means to a desirable
end

Excuse

Theory of character: Limited, * Insanity
temporal distortion in actor's * Duress
character; capacity for choice * Involuntary
distorted.
intoxication
* Theory
of
voluntariness:
Involuntariness of the act in
question
* Instrumental view: Utilitarianonly conduct that can be deterred
*

ought to be punished.
6

Supr note i, at

542.

This relationship of justifications to the act concerned is what leads many theorists
like Nicola Lacey to state that the plea of justification goes to the actus reus i.e. it
renders the act itself not wrongful. Excuses go to the mens rea, i.e. they excuse
actors, not acts. See N.LcEY, RECONSTRUCTING CRIMINALwV50 (1997).
* Supra note 4, at 8n.
9 Fletcher defines attribution in a technical sense as follows: "The notion of attribution
is simply an affirmative description of the finding that wrongful conduct is
unexcused, and in this sense, culpable." Supra note 4, at 454.
15
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As indicated in Table i t, the rationale underlying the recognition of

justifications and excuses in the criminal law are not the same. The most common
underlying principle for justificatory claims is the utilitarian view involving a
balancing of interests and a privileging of conduct that is in furtherance of the
greater interest. 0 The obvious problem with such a theory is that it would, by
implication, justify the taking of an innocent life if it helped to save a greater
number of lives, which is an absurd result in criminal theory today." The Kantian

standpoint insists on recognizing certain absolutes, such as the value of an innocent
life, which cannot be compromised by being placed on the balance of competing
interests. Criminal statutes deal with these conflicting viewpoints by qualifying
the balancing of interests with an additional condition, namely one requiring
there to be an "appropriate means to the end" This becomes clear when we
observe that the justificatory claim of self defence does not extend to causing the
death of the aggressor except in certain exceptional circumstances, since that
would be an inappropriate means to the end- say defending oneself against a
minor assault by a friend.
'2

On the other hand, for recognizing excuses in the criminal law there are two
common rationales. The first theory requires the excuse to be based on a limited,
temporal distortion of the actor's character.3 The excusing circumstances must
be such as to distort the actor's capacity for choice in a limited situation. This
OG.Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, in

JUSTIFICATION AND ExcUss IN

57 (M.L.Corrado, ed., 1994).
In the path-breaking judgment of Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q. B. D. 273
(1884), the disastrous consequences of a purely utilitarian perspective on the defence
of 'necessity' became obvious. The case involved the voluntary killing and
consumption of a cabin-boy by a group of people stranded at sea, who would have
otherwise perished from starvation. The Queen's bench adopted a Kantian approach
and rejected the possibility of justification where the act is one of killing an innocent
person. The court rejected the proposition that a man may save his own life by
killing, if necessary, an innocent and unoffending neighbour.
THE CRIMINAL LAw

2

The German Criminal Code, 1975 combines both these approaches. The defence of

lesser evils under this code provides that it is not sufficient that the harm avoided
simply outweigh the harm caused. The former must "essentially and substantially"
outweigh the latter. Second, the German provision contains a unique qualification
requiring that the "act be an appropriate means" to avoid the risk. Thus the
justification of killings like the killing and consuming of a cabin boy in Dudley &
Stephens stands avoided. The Model Penal Code, in contrast, allows for the justification
of taking innocent lives as well.
G.FLETCIER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 802 (2000). Social deprivation and other such
suggested defences are successfully left out if this theoretical rationale is adopted
because in such cases, the influence of experience on character would be too pervasive
to constitute an excuse.

16
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makes it unfair to draw inferences about the actor's character from his act. The
second approach starts with the premise that the law should punish only in cases
of voluntary wrongdoing. This approach is thus linked to the concept of
voluntariness, understood in a moral or normative (and not physical) sense.14
The determination of the question whether an act was voluntary or not, ironically,
sometimes boils down to a balancing of interests like in the case of justification.
Such a weighing is done to evaluate what we consider as the normal and appropriate
response to pressure. A conduct can be perceived as morally involuntary even if
the cost substantially exceeds the benefit. However when the harm done is
disproportionately high compared to the harm avoided, the involuntariness of
the act is considerably negated.'5 For example, consider a hypothetical case where
Sharmila receives a threat that if she does not pay a crore of rupees to Ram, her
daughter will be kidnapped. Acting under this pressure, she kills Ram. On a balance
of interests, her conduct is not justified because it involved doing greater harm
than good. However, Sharmila might still be excused because the enormous fear
and pressure on her made her act almost 'involuntary' 1s

It is submitted that the second approach is a superior approach and it
helps to cure several of the defects in the 'theory of character.' For one, it avoids
the claim that determining the wrongdoer's desert depends on perceiving the
kind of character she has- a claim basic to the 'theory of character'. The claim is
14

The theory of voluntariness raises questions about environmental determinism, the
belief that all our actions are influenced by our environment and life's circumstances.
This is a topic that is beyond the scope of this article. However it must be noted that

to accept an argument of determinism would involve a complete re-think on our
'5

criminal system based on responsibility for one's conduct.
The language of the Model Penal Code, (hereinafter "MPC") demonstrates how as
we lower the degree of harm to others and increase the threshold of harm to the

accused (say, a person under duress), we will reach a threshold at which, "a

person of reasonable firmness" would be "unable to resist". A useful tool to make

16

the moral judgment about what the threshold ought to be is comparing the
interests at stake.
Fletcher provides a similar example of a situation where a terrorist group kidnaps

an heiress, Patty, and threatens to kill her unless she robs a bank with them. Since
Patty was coerced into committing the offence, her conduct is not voluntary and
can be "excused". Fletcher points out that the controlling criterion is that a person
of reasonable firmness in her situation would have been unable to resist the coercion.
Fletcher provides another example of a starving woman who enters a grocery store
and steals a loaf of bread. She and her baby have not eaten for several days and
they have no money to buy food. Fletcher points out that if her attempted theft
was justified, then the shopkeeper would not have a right to prevent her from
taking the loaf. However, if her conduct was excused, the attempted theft still
remains wrongful and the shopkeeper may use at least reasonable force to resist
the intrusion. Supra note 4, at 760, 830.

17
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problematic because it requires us to believe that people choose to develop the
kind of character they have. Apart from psychological and genetic make-up, it
is hard to assert that we can trace every character trait to a prior act of choice,
making it akin to a lifestyle choice of sorts. The second rationale will thus be
taken as the basic rationale underlying the theory of excuses for the rest of this
paper.
C. Utility of the Distinction
The conceptual distinction between justification and excuse is not merely
an academic exercise. It does have important implications for the criminal law,
some of which form the subject of the present article. The prima facie importance
of this distinction lies in their varying impact on the rights of third parties. Justified
conduct would imply a "no right" of resistance and a right to assist others in
carrying out the justified conduct." A conduct that is merely excused, on the
other hand, may rightly be resisted by the victim or third parties. The aiding of
wrongful conduct that has been excused is similarly considered wrongful and
illegal.
Justifications and excuses also give out very different moral messages.B
While justifications send out the message that conduct that is otherwise
considered wrongful becomes right or justified by the existence of certain
extraordinary circumstances, excuses do not assert the rightness of the conduct
in question. The moral message of excusatory defences is that it would be wrong
for society to punish persons for conduct that cannot be properly attributed to
them. The main function of the criminal law, the guiding of human conduct by
the use of moral messages,1 ' is therefore undermined when justifications and
excuses are conflated.
A third importance of a sound theory of justification and excuse is in
demarcating the rights of defendants in criminal law. It helps us logically arrive at
the appropriate means of fixing the standard of proof as well as allocating the
burden of proof on exculpatory claims- an exercise that has a sure impact on
substantive criminal justice. In all, a failure to recognize the distinction between
justifications and excuses can often lead to bad law, both substantive and
procedural. The remainder of this paper is an effort to further explicate and justify
this claim.
"

Supra note 4, at 531.

"8

J. Dressler, PartialJustificationor Partial Excuse, (1988) 51(4) Mouns LAw REV. 467,
470.

'9

Hart, Aims of the CriminalLaw, (1958) 23

18
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II.

JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE UNDER THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE

The distinction between justification and excuse is often not obvious by
reading the wordings of statutes. The problem is further exacerbated in systems
such as the Anglo-American legal systems, which are overtly oriented towards
a positivistic approach to criminal theory. Such systems .have historically
demonstrated a rather poor appreciation of the distinct nature of justificatory
and excusatory claims since the emphasis is mainly on determining whether
the conduct in question should be punished by the court strictly under the
law. It would be safe to guess that the IPC, whose drafters were greatly influenced
by principles prevailing in common law at the time, would show a similar
approach.
The analysis of the IPC is undertaken with a survey of the major provisions
for defences or exceptions under the said Code. The following table attempts to
view these provisions in comparison with Fletcher's categorization of similar
provisions in the Model Penal Code20 in the United States.
Table 2.1 highlights the points of convergence and divergence of the defences
under the IPC with Fletcher's theory of justification and excuse. The claims of
'necessary defence' and 'lesser evils', which Fletcher considers to be paradigmatic
of justifications, seem to conform more or less to Fletcher's categorization, albeit
the rationales underlying them could be slightly different. So also with Insanity
and Involuntary Intoxication which are in Fletcher's view paradigmatic of excuses.
Problematic questions centering round these defences have more to do with the
allocation of legal and evidentiary burdens and are examined in greater depth in
the following sections of the article. In the present context, the ambiguities arise
when we move from these black-and-white issues to the gray areas of Provocation
in murder, Voluntary intoxication and Duress.
The author believes that the impact of such ambiguities is to create
inconsistencies within the criminal law, with the result that the substantive
criminal law is not an internally coherent body of principles and policies. This
in turn impacts the position of defendants in the criminal law and the
appropriateness of imposing a particular punishment for the commission of a
particular offence,
0 The MPC clearly distinguishes between justifications and excuses as distinct
exculpatory claims. Article 3 of the Code deals exclusively with Justification defences
while Articles 2 and 4 deal with Excuse Defences separately.

19
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Table 2.1: A Comparative Survey & Categorization of Defences
Exculpatory
Claim

Model
Penal Code

Fletcher's
ideal

Provision under IPC Nature of
claim
under IPC

categorization

Involuntary
intoxication

Excuse

Excuse

Section 85: Act of a Excuse
person incapable of
judgment by reason of
intoxication
caused
against

Self-induced

Partial

intoxication

excuse

Total Excuse

Section

his will

86:

Offence Ambiguous

requiring a particular

intent or knowledge
committed by one who
is

Excuse

Insanity

intoxicated

Section 84: Act of a Excuse
person of unsound

Excuse

mind not an offence.

Duress

Excuse:
recommends
extending it
to homicide
cases also.

Complete
Excuse

Section 94: Act to Ambiguous
which a person is
conpelled by threatsdoes not extend to
murder & offences
against the State with
penalty

___________________________________death

Necessity

Justification

Justification

______

Sections 96- io6: The Justification
right to defend the
person or property of
oneself or others

Provocation
in homicide
cases

Partial
Excuse

Not
expressly
stated

Lesser Evils

Justification
(No
condition of
'imminent
danger'.)

Justification

Exception 1 to Section Ambiguous
300:
Culpable
homicide is not murder
in cases of 'grave and
sudden provocation'.
Section 81: Act likely to Justification
cause harm but done
without
criminal
intent, and to prevent
other harm. (Condition
of 'imminent harm'
present.)

intoxication serves to reduce the degree of the offence (eg: murder to
manslaughter). It is based on the principle that it negates the specific intent without
negating the general intent of the particular offence.
In Fletcher's view, the German Code, which makes voluntary intoxication a complete
excuse (and punishes crimes committed under the influence of self-induced
intoxication separately) contains the ideal version of this claim.

21 Self-induced

22

20
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A. Duress Under the IPC- Justification or Excuse?

Duress as a defence in section 94 of the IPC is a fitting representation of
legislative intent fluctuating between treating it as an excuse and a justification.
The said section seeks to limit the applicability of this defence to offences other
than 'murder and offences against the State punishable with death'. The propriety
of such a limitation depends on whether the defence is a justification or excuse.
Treating the defence as a justification, i.e. using 'balancing of interests' as its
underlying rationale, would explain the existence of such a limitation. This would
mean that in the legislature's estimation, the taking of an innocent life tips the
balance towards wrongful conduct and does not merit a 'privilege'. But such a
treatment of the defence leads to other unacceptable consequences. For instance,
consider a situation where Ramesh, at gunpoint has been asked to break into
Manju's house. If we state that Ramesh's act of breaking in under duress is justified,
it would lead to the conclusion that Manju has no right to resist the attack. It
would also imply that Manju's neighbour cannot assist her in quelling the
aggressive act because conduct that is justified is not considered wrongful. It thus
affects a whole matrix of legal relationships in a detrimental manner. This is why
Fletcher considers duress to be a paradigmatic example of an excuse, along with
insanity and involuntary intoxication. It is so regarded in France23 , Germany24
and under the Model Penal Code in the United States. The English Courts have also
clearly set the precedent in the landmark case of Regina v. Hudson,' making
'involuntariness' of the defendant's act the underlying issue in duress. Now if we
accept that duress is an excuse, there is no rationale for not extending it to cases
of murder as well. The usual counter is that we as a society consider it wrongful to
give into fear or temptation to such an extent as to take the innocent life of
another.26 But that argument is self-defeating because excusing a conduct does
not speak to its wrongfulness at all. It merely says that it would be unfair to hold
the accused responsible for the wrong that he committed, be it stealing or murder.

It is submitted that section 94 should be amended with a better grasp of the
conceptual distinction between a justification and an excuse, in line with the
evolution of the law of duress in various parts of the world.
23

24

Article 122-2 of the French Penal Code provides that "A person is not criminally
liable who acted under the influence of a force or constraint which he could not

resist."
§ 34 of the German Penal Code provides that "Whoever commits an unlawful act in

order to avert an imminent and otherwise unavoidable danger to his own life, limb,
or liberty, or to that of a relative or person close to him, acts without guilt. This rule
does not apply if under the prevailing circumstances the perpetrator could be expected
to have assumed the risk, especially because he was himself the cause of the danger
or because he found himself in a special legal relationship..."
26

[1971] 2 All E. R. 244 (Crim. App.).

26

Supra note 1, at 560.
21
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The defence of duress in section 94 is just one of the demonstrations of a
poor appreciation of the distinction between justification and excuse under the
IPC as made out by Fletcher. Further inconsistencies become apparent on
examination of other provisions such as voluntary intoxication and provocation
in murder in the context of the implications of such defences for punishment and
the allocation of the burden of proof.

III.

CULPABILITY- A BINARY CODE OR GRADED SCALE?

A. The Basis of Punishment

An examination of the relationship of exculpatory claims to punishment
requires, as a starting point, an understanding of the basis for punishment in our
criminal systems today. In the days of yore, 'liability' was the basis of punishment.27
This meant that a violation of the norms prescribed by the law was a necessary
and sufficient condition for awarding punishment. Such a position resulted in
complete insensitivity towards the individualized conditions under which crimes
are committed, some of which may render the crime blameless?8 From the
nineteenth century onwards, there has been a shift in the moral justification for
punishment- from 'liability' to normative guilt or culpability.29 In this view,
normative guilt serves as the moral pre-condition of just punishment. In other
words, the distribution of punishment revolves around the question, "All things
considered, would it be fair and right to hold this particular actor culpable for the
violation of a legal norm?" The notion of culpability i.e. the innocence or guilt of
the defendant is much wider than, and inclusive of, the previous concept of liability.
B. Partial Defences and Graded Culpability
The similarity between justifications and excuses is that both generally
negate culpability, albeit by different means, and thus lead to complete acquittals.
However, mitigational (partial) defences, which partially negate culpability, give
rise to far more complications by the manner in which they seek to allocate
punishment. Two of the defences listed in Table 2.1 above are mitigational namely
'Voluntary Intoxication' and 'Grave and Sudden Provocation' in homicide cases.
The status of both under the IPC has been marked as ambiguous, indicating the
confusion prevalent in the treatment of such defences. These are now considered
in some detail to find out if there are any fundamental theoretical flaws in the
treatment of these defences that renders them problematic.
27

28

G. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason, in JusTIcAroN AND EXCUSE IN THE
CRIMNAL LAw 3o6 (M.L.Corrado, ed., 1994).
See G.Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, in JusTifWATION AND EXCUSE
IN ThE CRIMINAL LAw 82 (M.L.Corrado, ed., 1994).

9 Supra note 4, at 536.
22
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Both the defences under consideration operate mainly in cases of homicide.
If successfully proven, they bring down a charge of murder to culpable homicide
not amounting to murder under section 299 IPC. (voluntary manslaughter in
England). Voluntary intoxication, as will be subsequently seen, is undoubtedly
an excuse because it does not seek to assert the rightness of the crime committed
in a state of inebriation. However, as will be seen, the provocation defence is not
as straightforward.
(i). The Defence ofProvocation
The defence of Grave and Sudden Provocation in murder is recognized in
several jurisdictions around the world,30 and most often, the trend has been
towards viewing it as an excuse.3 ' The provocation defence in India, found in
Exception i to section 300 of the IPC, seems to be an excuse in as far as it requires
the offender to be "deprived of the power of self control by grave and sudden
provocation". Thus "non-voluntariness" as a result of the intended victim's
provocation appears to be the basis for this exception. However, matters get

muddled when one reads the provisos to this exception. These indicate that the
.wrongful conduct" or provocation by the victim makes the killing by the
defendant less wrongful. For example, this defence cannot be invoked if the

provocation is given by "anything done in obedience to the law" or when the
provocation is given by "anything done in lawful exercise of the right of private

defence". Only a (partly) justificatory defence would hinge on the partly wrongful
conduct of the victim that mitigates the wrong committed by the accused? Thus
this section incorporates both the justificatory and the excusatory approaches,
whose underlying rationales are incompatible, in order to establish a lower degree
of culpability..

It is the author's belief that provocation should not be viewed as a
justification since it would involve giving out unacceptable moral messages to

so

Germany, France, South Africa, England and the MPC all recognize provocation as
a partial excuse in murder bringing the liability down to a lowe.r offence.
31M. Wasik, PartialDefences in the CriminalLaw, (1982) 45(5) MODERN LAw REV. 516.
3

S. Yea, UNRfSTRAINEDKILLINGSANDTHEL Aw- PROVOCATION IN INDIA, ENGLAND AND AUSTRAMA(1998).
Stanley Yeo expresses the view that the rationale of the provocation defence in India
is that the killing was partly the fault of the victim, and thereby justificatory. This
view is mistaken for the reasons already enumerated above. A victim who utters
insulting words or breaks some unpleasant news to the accused surely does not deserve

to be fatally attacked, even to a miniscule extent.
3

A view has been expressed that a similarly confused approach has been displayed by

courts in England and the United States. The Courts in India have mostly stressed on
the non-voluntary" aspect of the defence, the lack of self-control of the provoked
person, However the ambiguity in the statute remains nonetheless.
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society. If a murder committed under grave and sudden provocation is justified,
it amounts to saying that it is acceptable to give into feelings of extreme rage,
disgust and jealousy and kill another human being, who ignited those passions
within us. Alternatively, it amounts to undermining the value of the victim's life
to some extent owing to his contribution in provoking the defendant. This latter
rationale is akin to that of self defence, where the life of the aggressor is considered
less valuable in the balance of interests, compared to the life of the victim. Both
these moral messages would be considered unacceptable to us as principles for
the guidance of human conduct. It is argued that by making provocation a
justification, the killings of women suffering from the Battered Woman Syndrome
would be included and justified, but if merely excused, would be excluded from
the purview of this defence. In response, attention must be drawn to the fact that
a justification would create a right, not just in the provoked person, but in third
parties as well, to launch a fatal attack on a person whose words or conduct is
provocative. The son of an abused and battered wife, or even a neighbour, would
be justified in killing the abuser. For, if the claim is that a provoker's life weighs
less in the balance of interests, it matters not who carries out the fatal attack on
him. This is a position which law and the courts must be averse to taking. The real
need for carving out a justification in cases of women suffering from the battered
woman syndrome is not being disputed. Perhaps it can be recognized as a nonparadigmatic instance of self-defence. The main argument being put forth is that
treating the defence of provocation as a partial justification is not an acceptable
means towards that end.
On the contrary, several theorists make a strong argument supporting the
explanation of the said defence as a partial excuse.34 However, the author believes
that the very concept of a 'partial excuse' is fundamentally flawed for the following
reasons. First, partial excuses are based on such distinctions as Basic and Specific
Intent35 - false distinctions in this context. If the purpose of an excuse is to negate

the requisite 'specific' mens rea, namely the intention to kill, there is no reason
why the basic intent of culpable homicide (or voluntary manslaughter) cannot be
negated in the same way. But at a deeper level, excuses are technically supposed
to be independent of the actus reus and mens rea elements of an offence. They
seek to establish a disconnect between the wrongful conduct and the character of
3

See J. Dressler, PartialJustification or PartialExcuse, (1988) 51(4)

MODERN LAW REV.

467, 470. One of the main arguments in favour of partial excuses is summed up in
Lord Diplock's statement that "it is not as if there is no intermediate stage between
icy detachment and going beserk.", quoted from Phillips, [1969] 2 A.C. 130 at 137.
Consequently it makes perfect sense for the law to assume that an enraged defendant
is capable of some measure of rational self control. See F. McAuley, Anticipating the
Past: The Defence of Provocation in Irish Law, (1987) 50 MODERN LAW Rv. 355.

3 Supra note , at 546.
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the actor. Viewed in this way, a theory of 'partial excuse' still fails to tell us how
the line between the actor's voluntariness and involuntariness has been drawn.
In other words, if my act of killing X was involuntary, how can the same act be
considered voluntary such that I am convicted of culpable homicide? Second,
those who insist on the utility of partial excuses in the criminal law do so because
of the importance of recognizing lower offences, especially in cases of homicide
where the death penalty is granted only for the highest form of homicide, namely
murder. This argument is sound in highlighting the necessity for there to be various
degrees of offences. The author is also not disputing the need to incorporate partial
defences into the law corresponding to the various degrees of an offence. The
mistaken link drawn by such an argument is in assuming that allowing for various
degrees of an offence would depend entirely on the recognition of partial or
mitigating excuses. It is mistaken because excuses, by their very nature, are most
suited to a 'binary code of moral culpability' and do not lend themselves easily to
a 'graded scale of culpability'. This is because it is inaccurate, if not impossible, to
draw up a graded scale of 'voluntariness' corresponding to a graded scale of moral
culpability based on which the existing offences are formulated. For instance,
section 299 is a less serious offence than murder under section 3oo. This means
that the moral 'wrongness' that attaches to section 299 is less than that under
section 3oo. Accordingly, the death penalty is only awarded in cases of murder.
Allowing a partial excuse like provocation to section 3oo involves estimating the
quantum of 'involuntariness' of the provoked individual that corresponds to the
decrease in moral culpability when we move from section 300 to section 299.
This is an absurd exercise; a comparison of oranges and apples; in fact, an attempt
to convert policy considerations into statutory criminal law with little heed to
maintain the internal coherence of the latter.36
(ii). Voluntary Intoxication as a Partial Defence
The defence of voluntary intoxication, under section 86 of the IPC is
subject to the same flawed theoretical basis of a 'partial excuse'. It is submitted
that all the inconsistencies which this defence gives rise to are products of this
fundamental flaw. Section 86 provides that in cases of homicide committed under
the influence of self-induced intoxication, the intention to commit the murder
is negated. However, the same knowledge is presumed as would have existed
had he not been intoxicated. In effect, this defence serves to reduce the liability
from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Involuntary
intoxication, on the other hand, serves as a complete excuse, even in cases of
36 In England, one such policy consideration is the need to prevent perverse acquittals
by juries. It is a commonly held view that they must be provided with an option of
convicting on a lower offence; otherwise the reluctance to convict on the highest
offence would lead to perverse acquittals which undermine the confidence in the
system.
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homicide. It may be presumed that the state of the defendant's mind in a state of
intoxication remains the same, whether it is voluntary or involuntary. By
selectively making voluntary intoxication a partial excuse, legislators have
mixed up the policy objective of discouraging intoxication induced crimes with

the need to recognize defences which acknowledge the involuntary elements of
the defendant's conduct.
On the flip side, partial justifications, lend themselves much better to a

graded scale of moral culpability, simply because justifications have a direct
bearing on the moral worth of the act in question. It is opined that the partial
defence of excessive self defence is crucial in reflecting the moral values and
expectations of society in cases involving fatal defensive action. This partial
justification, embodied in Exception 2 to section 300, on evaluation, is found
to be sound in principle, criminal legal theory and practice.?'This may be
attributed to it being based on the sounder theoretical rationale of partial
justification rather than partial excuse? 8 It is submitted that partial excuses
in the law need to be done away with and replaced, wherever possible with
separate "fallback offences"39 Although the creation of such offences is
admittedly controversialt they are successful in reflecting underlying policy
considerations directly instead of forcing the defence into the uncomfortable
category of 'partial excuse'.
3

Supra note 33, at 174.

Stanley Yeo himself mistakenly considers this defence to be a partial excuse. This
position, however, cannot be supported by a reading of the statutory provision and
an examination of the various rationales underlying this defence. The emphasis is
not so much on the non voluntariness of the defendant's action as on the partial
rightness of the conduct which at least originated in the right to private defence.
3 For instance, the German Criminal Code, 1975 has a "fallback offence" that punishes
crimes committed while voluntarily intoxicated. § 323A of the said Code, describing
the offence of "Total Intoxication", provides as follows: "(i) Whoever intentionally
or negligently get intoxicated with alcoholic beverages or other intoxicants, shall be
punished with imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine, if he commits an
unlawful act while in this condition and may not be punished because of it because
he lacked the capacity to be adjudged guilty due to the intoxication, or this cannot
be excluded." Thus a partial excuse, namely voluntary intoxication, has been done
away with and replaced by a new offence which directly addresses the policy
requirement of making the act of getting dangerously intoxicated culpable. An
offence created thus is known as a "fallback offence".
40 Wasik, while making a case for partial excuses, expresses the view that the creation
of such fallback offences is impractical and hard to implement. See supra note 31, at
516. However, these practical difficulties can be surmounted, especially if it is
towards a worthwhile end iLe. bringing coherence into the theory of excuses in
substantive criminal law. The German Criminal Code is a case in point.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION
A. Structure of a Wrongdoing
The concept of 'culpability' as a wider category than 'liability', explained at
the start of the preceding section, also forms the starting point of the present
enquiry. The emergence of culpability or guilt as an all-encompassing basis for
punishment had to necessarily involve a re-conceptualization of what a
wrongdoing is. In the earlier paradigm, guilt was synonymous with a violation of
the elements of an offence. Exculpatory claims were extrinsic to the finding of
guilt- a person could thus be "guilty but excused". Fletcher provides a clear picture
of the 'structure of wrongdoing'41 which is consistent with the current posture of
guilt being synonymous with culpability.
WRONGDOING = INCULPATORY DIMENSION +

Definition ofoffense

EXCULPATORY DIMENSION

Claims ofJustification & Excuse

The intention and knowledge required for the offence of murder are
subjective components of the definition of the offense, objectively determined.
The concept of culpability arises in connection with the distinct inquiry into the
attribution of wrongful conduct.4 2 Claims of justification and excuse do not bear
upon the mens rea of the offence but rather bear upon the attribution of the
wrongful conduct to the defendant.
B. Understanding Culpability: 'Burdens' Re-examined
Under the earlier notion of culpability, the burden of persuasion43 on all
substantive matters of guilt was on the prosecution. Since exculpatory claims
were considered to be extrinsic to the finding of guilt, the burden of persuasion
for the 'affirmative defences' such as insanity was on the defence, to be proven by
a lesser standard of proof namely a preponderance of evidence. This method of
allocating burdens is a hangover of what Fletcher calls the 'Private Law style' in
criminal disputes.44 A new understanding of the nature of criminal guilt, as being
very different from liability in civil law, led to a radically different approach to the
burden of persuasion in criminal cases. It is hardly surprising that the refinement
of the normative theory of culpability coincided in German legal history with the
progressive shifting of the risk of residual doubt to the prosecution. In Anglo4'

Supra note 4, at 532.

42

Supra note 4, at

552.

3 Criminal theorists designate the burden of persuasion by using the technical term
"legal burden" of proof.
44 Supra note 4, at 524.
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American law, the refinement of the concept of 'presumption of innocence' became
the rationale for the prosecutor bearing the burden of persuasion on matters of
defence as well.4
In short, the new approach was a rediscovery of an age-old principle that
the criminal law should only punish the guilty. It only remains to find out how to
determine who should bear the burden of proof on a particular issue. The pertinent
question to ask is, "Does the issue bear on the culpability of the actor?" If the
answer is yes, then the prosecution ought to rightly bear the burden of residual
doubt. Conceptualizing justifications and excuses as claims intrinsic to a finding
of culpability or normative guilt would thus lead to an automatic conclusion that
the prosecution should bear the burden of persuasion on these claims as well.
The counter to this statement is that it is not reasonable to expect the
prosecution not only to prove the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable
doubt but also to prove the absence of all the defences, which are essentially
negative claims, in every case beyond a reasonable doubt. This is where the
distinction between the legal burden and evidential burden becomes relevant.
The evidential burden, the obligation to show that there is sufficient evidence to

raise an issue as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue, still rests with
the defence. However the legal burden of proof, the obligation to meet the
requirement that the fact in issue be disproved beyond reasonable doubt, rests at
all times with the prosecution.46 Hence the risk of residual doubt, raised by
exculpatory claims, whether justifications or excuses, must be borne by the
prosecution.
In India, section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act47 places the legal (and
evidential) burden of proof of any of the exculpatory claims on the accused. It is
evident that legislators in India have not recovered from the 'private law' hangover
in criminal litigation. The result is an archaic and logically unsound provision
such as section 105, which relies upon an outdated notion of guilt in allocating the
burdens of proof. As a consequence, an insane person in India still bears the
burden of proving that he did not know the nature of his act.48 It is submitted that
4
46
47

48

Id.
MURPHY, MURPHY ON EVIDENCE 86 (1997).
§ 105 states, "When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the
P.

existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions
in the Indian Penal Code or within any special exceptions or proviso contained in any
other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the
Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances."
See Illustration (a) to § 1o5, Indian Evidence Act.
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it should be amended to be in line with the current notion of culpability as being
an all-encompassing rationale for punishment, placing the legal burden of proving
all substantive issues bearing on guilt where it rightfully belongs.

CONCLUSION
The distinction between justification and excuse, as propounded by George
Fletcher, is of considerable theoretical and practical significance. Justifications,
which speak to the 'rightness' of the act in question, serve the purpose of guiding
future conduct. It matters greatly for a person whose house is being burgled to
know how far his right to private defence extends and whether killing the burglar
is considered justified in law. On the contrary, excuses leave the moral
"9wrongness" of the act untouched; they are claims that it is not fair to hold that
particular actor, particularly situated, guilty for his wrongful act. Therefore excuses
are not meant to be relied upon in a situation of extreme pressute for the guidance
of conduct. Thus the need for clarity in the rationale underlying a defence
recognized by law, i.e. whether it is a justificatory or an excusatory defence,
stands established. This article also argues that since excuses, by their very nature,
are only compatible with a 'binary code of moral culpability', their inclusion as
partial defences in the law leads to various inconsistencies in the law.
Justifications, which easily lend themselves to being mapped on a graded scale of
moral culpability, are far more suited to be partial defences. The importance of
the implications of this theory on issues of punishment also stands established.
Finally, the structural relationship of exculpatory claims (both justifications and
excuses) to the notion of wrongdoing or culpability has a procedural analogue in
the way the burden of proof for these exculpatory claims is allocated. It emerges,
that in accordance with the currently accepted notion of culpability and the
relationship of exculpatory claims thereto, the legal burden of disproving
exculpatory claims beyond reasonable doubt ought to rest with the prosecution
in criminal trials. These are the procedural or evidential implications of this theory.
This understanding of Fletcher's theory and its various implications in
criminal law is thus a useful tool in the analysis of defences provided in the IPC. It
was found that the IPC displays a sorry lack of appreciation of the distinction
between a justificatory and an excusatory defence. This confused approach was
most acute in regard of the partial defences such as Duress, Voluntary Intoxication
and Provocation in Murder. Based on the analysis undertaken in this article, the
following suggestions are put forthwith respect to these defences to make them
theoretically sound:

29

Votl 19(1)

Student Bar Review

2007

* First, the defence of duress must be clearly articulated as a complete
excuse; the proviso restricting the scope of the defence to cases other
than 'murder and offences against the State with death penalty' must be
deleted.
* Second, the partial defence of grave and sudden provocation in Exception
1 to section 300 of the IPC should be altogether abolished. While treating
the defence as a partial justification leads to unacceptable moral
messages being sent out in society, treating it as a partial excuse makes
it prey to the fundamental theoretical flaw inherent in the very concept
of a partial excuse. The scope of existing defences such as self-defence
can be expanded to incorporate pressing policy concerns such as the
need to justify homicides by women suffering from the battered woman
syndrome.
* Third, intoxication, whether voluntary or involuntary, should be made
a complete excuse, thereby ridding the law of existing inconsistencies
and false distinctions. A fall-back offence must be drafted in deference
to the conflicting principle of liability for the risk implicit in getting drunk,
along the lines of the provision in the German Criminal Code. 9
* Finally, all exculpatory claims including insanity should require the
prosecution to bear the legal burden of proof, in keeping with the
currently accepted notion of culpability. Thus section 105 of the Indian
Evidence Act must be amended accordingly to ensure that procedural
law accurately reflects the currently accepted position that exculpatory
claims are intrinsic to the all-encompassing notion of culpability.

4 Supra note 37.
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